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Av Svenn Dybvik - 23 maj 2024 00:00

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2023

ENISA Threat Landscape 2023

This is the eleventh edition of the ENISA Threat Landscape (ETL) report, an annual report on the status of the cybersecurity threat landscape. It identifies the top threats, major trends observed with respect to threats, threat actors and attack techniques, as well as impact and motivation analysis. It also describes relevant mitigation measures. This year’s work has again been supported by ENISA’s ad hoc Working Group on Cybersecurity Threat Landscapes (CTL).

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2023/@@download/fullReport

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/


Warfare and Geopolitics are Fuelling Denial-of-Service Attacks


The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)’s new report on the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks threat landscape finds 66% of DoS attacks are politically motivated.


The analysis is based on 310 verified Denial-of-Service (DoS) incidents during the reporting period of January 2022 to August 2023. However, this total number only represents the incidents gathered from open sources.

A large-scale study is also included of publicly reported incidents. The study focuses on the motivations of attackers, their goals and the socio-political profiles of targets.

DOS attack threat landscape report 2023

Since the beginning of 2022, DoS attacks have turned into a novel and massive threat using new techniques and are fuelled by warfare motivations.

In the last few years, DoS attacks have become easier, cheaper and more aggressive than ever before. The emergence of new armed conflicts around the world acted as fuel to new waves of DoS attacks where newly formed threat actors pick and choose targets without fear of repercussions.

 

Objective of report:

To provide a better understanding of this type of threat by analysing the motivations and impact of the DoS attacks and raise awareness at the same time by suggesting prevention and remediation recommendations.

The research performed illustrates that most impacted sectors over the reported period covering January 2022 to August 2023 are associated with government services. These attacks stand as retaliation acts triggered by political decisions.

The report highlights that the last few years, DoS attacks have increased in number especially in the public administration and have become easier and more aggressive than before, largely due to geopolitical reasons. The current DoS threat landscape is greatly influenced by the emergence of the recent armed conflicts around the world and especially by the Russia-Ukraine War that fuelled new waves of DoS attacks where recently introduced threat actors select targets without the fear of repercussions.

The study also illustrates that while no sector is exempted from DoS attacks, the government infrastructure has become a preferred target by threat actors that often manage to be successful by causing downtime.

 

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The most affected sector was the government administration sector, accounting for receiving 46% of attacks.
  • It is estimated that 66% of the attacks were motivated by political reasons or activist agendas.
  • Overall, 50% of the global incidents were found to be related to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
  • The study shows that 8% of the attacks caused total disruption in the target.
  • The analysis of DoS attacks' motivations and goals is based on the new taxonomy used to classify such attacks based on information publicly available about the attacks the targets for a more systematic analysis approach.
  • Warfare is a key gameplayer and organisations would benefit from prevention and remediation strategies.
  • Reporting of DoS attacks has not reached the maturity needed to allow for the real extent and impact of such attacks.

 

Key challenges

 


The detection, description and analysis of DoS attacks is highly complex and different from other cybersecurity attacks. In other types of cybersecurity attacks, such as exploitation of services or even supply chain attacks, the attackers leave artefacts behind that the incident responders can find, analyse, share, confirm, verify and ultimately use for some explanation or even attribution. In the case of DoS attacks artefacts do not exist or are usually fake ones. This is part of the reasons why official databases of such attacks are difficult to be compiled.

The report sheds light on 3 types of information one must be warned against when seeking to analyse DoS incidents:

  • The good quality of information: paradoxically, this is the information coming from reports and claims made by the attackers themselves.
  • The bad quality of information: information coming from DoS protection providers that actually stopped the attacks.
  • The ugly quality of information: information coming from reports created by the targets.

 

What is a Denial-of-Service or DoS attack?

 

There is a wide range of difficulties when it comes to defining what a DoS attack is.

Denial-of-service attacks (DoS) are defined for this report as availability attacks in which attackers, partially or totally, obstruct the legitimate use of a target's service by depleting or exploiting the target's assets over a period of time.

A Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack DDoS is a subset of DoS attacks. DoS attacks can be distributed which means that they may originate from thousands of sources from all over the world, usually relying on large-scale botnets or proxies.

 

Further Information

ENISA Threat Landscape for DoS Attacks - 2023

ENISA Threat Landscape - 2023

Contact

For press questions and interviews, please contact press (at) enisa.europa.eu

 

 

Stay updated - subscribe to RSS feeds of both ENISA news items & press releases!

News items:

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/news-wires/RSS

PRs:

http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/press-releases/press-releases/RSS

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/checking-up-on-health-ransomware-accounts-for-54-of-cybersecurity-threats


Checking-up on Health: Ransomware Accounts for 54% of Cybersecurity Threats


The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) releases today its first cyber threat landscape for the health sector. The report found that ransomware accounts for 54% of cybersecurity threats in the health sector.


The comprehensive analysis maps and studies cyberattacks, identifying prime threats, actors, impacts, and trends for a period of over 2 years, providing valuable insights for the healthcare community and policy makers. The analysis is based on a total of 215 publicly reported incidents in the EU and neighbouring countries.

Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Juhan Lepassaar, said: “A high common level of cybersecurity for the healthcare sector in the EU is essential to ensure health organisations can operate in the safest way. The rise of the covid-19 pandemic showed us how we critically depend on health systems. What I consider as a wake-up call confirmed we need to get a clear view of the risks, the attack surface and the vulnerabilities specific to the sector. Access to incident reporting data must therefore be facilitated to better visualise and comprehend our cyber threat environment and identify the appropriate mitigation measures we need to implement.”

The findings

The report reveals a concerning reality of the challenges faced by the EU health sector during the reporting period.

  • Widespread incidents. The European health sector experienced a significant number of incidents, with healthcare providers accounting for 53% of the total incidents. Hospitals, in particular, bore the brunt, with 42% of incidents reported. Additionally, health authorities, bodies and agencies (14%), and the pharmaceutical industry (9%) were targeted.
  • Ransomware and data breaches. Ransomware emerged as one of the primary threats in the health sector (54% of incidents). This trend is seen as likely to continue. Only 27% of surveyed organisations in the health sector have a dedicated ransomware defence programme. Driven by financial gain, cybercriminals extort both health organisations and patients, threatening to disclose data, personal or sensitive in nature. Patient data, including electronic health records, were the most targeted assets (30%). Alarmingly, nearly half of all incidents (46%) aimed to steal or leak health organisations' data.
  • Impact and lessons learned by the COVID-19 Pandemic. It is essential to note that the reporting period coincided with a significant portion of the COVID-19 pandemic era, during which the healthcare sector became a prime target for attackers. Financially motivated threat actors, driven by the value of patient data, were responsible for the majority of attacks (53%). The pandemic saw multiple instances of data leakage from COVID-19-related systems and testing laboratories in various EU countries. Insiders and poor security practices, including misconfigurations, were identified as primary causes of these leaks. The incidents serve as a stark reminder of the importance of robust cybersecurity practices, particularly in times of urgent operational needs.
  • Vulnerabilities in Healthcare Systems. Attacks on healthcare supply chains and service providers resulted in disruptions or losses to health organisations (7%). Such types of attacks are expected to remain significant in the future, given the risks posed by vulnerabilities in healthcare systems and medical devices. A recent study by ENISA revealed that healthcare organisations reported the highest number of security incidents related to vulnerabilities in software or hardware, with 80% of respondents citing vulnerabilities as the cause of more than 61% of their security incidents.
  • Geopolitical Developments and DDoS Attacks. Geopolitical developments and hacktivist activity led to a surge in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by pro-Russian hacktivist groups against hospitals and health authorities in early 2023, accounting for 9% of total incidents. While this trend is expected to continue, the actual impact of these attacks remains relatively low.
  • The incidents examined in the report had significant consequences for health organisations, primarily resulting in breaches or theft of data (43%) disrupted healthcare services (22%) and disrupted services not related to healthcare (26%). The report also highlights the financial losses incurred, with the median cost of a major security incident in the health sector estimated at €300,000 according to the ENISA NIS Investment 2022 study. 
  • Patient safety emerges as a paramount concern for the health community, given potential delays in triage and treatment caused by cyber incidents.

 

 

 

 

 

 

New report from the NIS Cooperation Group

The NIS Cooperation Group releases today its report on “Threats and risk management in the health sector – Under the NIS Directive”. As a first assessment on the measures currently in place, the study sheds light on the different cybersecurity challenges in risk mitigation faced by the EU health sector. Together with relevant threat taxonomies and cyber incident data, the report discloses business continuity and mitigation recommendations to limit the likelihood and impacts of a cyber related incident.

 

Background

The ENISA threat landscape reports map the cyber threat landscape to help decision makers, policy makers and security specialists define strategies to defend citizens, organisations and cyberspace.

The report’s content is gathered from open sources such as media articles, expert opinions, intelligence reports, incident analysis and security research reports; as well as through the members of the ENISA Cyber Threat Landscapes Working Group (CTL working group).

The analysis and views of the threat landscape by ENISA is meant to be industry and vendor neutral. Information based on OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) and the work of ENISA on Situational Awareness also helped document the analysis presented in the report.

 

Further Information

Health Threat Landscape – ENISA report 2023

ENISA topic: Health

ENISA topic: Cyber threats

CSIRT capabilities in healthcare sector – ENISA report 2021

Cloud security for healthcare services – ENISA report 2021

Procurement guidelines for cybersecurity in hospitals

 

 

 

 

 

 


References


 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/data-protection

ENISA is committed to the protection of individuals’ privacy and data protection.


The rights to privacy and data protection are fundamental rights, set out in articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.


ENISA, as an EU Agency, is subject to the Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. This Regulation has the same level and types of rules for the protection of personal data as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is applicable to all EU Member States.


In order to function and meet its tasks and objectives, ENISA needs to collect and further process personal data of its staff members, as well as other natural persons in the context of its different activities in the areas of human resources, procurement and finance, corporate services (e.g. IT services), as well as in the context of the functioning of ENISA’s governance bodies and core operations.


What is personal data?


Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier, such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to his or her physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.


Examples of personal data include: names, pictures, contact details, emails, CVs, diplomas, recommendation letters, professional & family life, bank details, transaction information, medical data, judicial & criminal records, CCTV footage, log files, IP addresses, cookies, etc.


How does ENISA process personal data?


ENISA process personal data in accordance with the principles and provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.


These provisions mandate the personal data shall be:


  • processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner;
  • collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes (“purpose limitation”);
  • adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (“data minimisation”);
  • accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date (“accuracy”’);
  • kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed  (‘storage limitation’);
  • processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’).

ENISA adheres to its obligations under the Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 and provides for the data subjects rights under this Regulation.


Further information:

ENISA’s central register of data processing activities

Data subjects rights under Regulation (EU) 2018/1725

ENISA’s Data Protection Officer 

Data protection with regard to ENISA’s website

 

https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/

https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/press-campaign-toolbox/visual-identity/banners/ecsm-partnerstoolkit.zip

https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/smarterthanahacker

https://privacyforum.eu/

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/pseudonymisation-techniques-and-best-practices

Pseudonymisation techniques and best practices

This report explores further the basic notions of pseudonymisation, as well as technical solutions that can support implementation in practice. Starting from a number of pseudonymisation scenarios, the report defines first the main actors that can be involved in the process of pseudonymisation along with their possible roles. It then analyses the different adversarial models and attacking techniques against pseudonymisation, such as brute force attack, dictionary search and guesswork. Moreover, it presents the main pseudonymisation techniques and policies available today.

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/pseudonymisation-techniques-and-best-practices/@@download/fullReport

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/data-pseudonymisation-advanced-techniques-and-use-cases

Data Pseudonymisation: Advanced Techniques and Use Cases

This report, building on the basic pseudonymisation techniques, examines advanced solutions for more complex scenarios that can be based on asymmetric encryption, ring signatures and group pseudonyms, chaining mode, pseudonyms based on multiple identifiers, pseudonyms with proof of knowledge and secure multi-party computation. It then applies some of these techniques in the area of healthcare to discuss possible pseudonymisation options in different example cases. Lastly, it examines the application of basic pseudonymisation techniques in common cybersecurity use cases, such as the use of telemetry and reputation systems.

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/data-pseudonymisation-advanced-techniques-and-use-cases/@@download/fullReport

 

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/engineering-personal-data-sharing

Engineering Personal Data Sharing

This report attempts to look closer at specific use cases relating to personal data sharing, primarily in the health sector, and discusses how specific technologies and considerations of implementation can support the meeting of specific data protection. After discussing some challenges in (personal) data sharing, this report demonstrates how to engineer specific technologies and techniques in order to enable privacy preserving data sharing. More specifically it discusses specific use cases for sharing data in the health sector, with the aim of demonstrating how data protection principles can be met through the proper use of technological solutions relying on advanced cryptographic techniques. Next it discusses data sharing that takes place as part of another process or service, where the data is processed through some secondary channel or entity before reaching its primary recipient. Lastly, it identifies challenges, considerations and possible architectural solutions on intervenability aspects (such as the right to erasure and the right to rectification when sharing data).

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/engineering-personal-data-sharing/@@download/fullReport

 

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/securing-personal-data-in-the-wake-of-ai

Securing Personal Data in the Wake of AI

This year’s Annual Privacy Forum focused on pressing personal data protection challenges raised by the ever faster-paced developments witnessed today in digital technologies and legislative initiatives.


Organised by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) together with the directorate general of the European Commission for communications networks, content and technology (DG Connect) and the National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (INRIA), the 2023 edition of the event took place in Lyon, France.

This 11th edition brought together a total of 26 speakers and over 400 participants both physically and remotely.

Panels of experts were given the chance to address some of the most pressing topics in relation to the securing of personal data, including:

  • Emerging Technologies for personal data protection;
  • Machine learning and personal data processing;
  • Personal data sharing under the European Data Strategy;
  • Promoting GDPR compliance and data subject rights.

European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Executive Director Juhan Lepassaar, commented:ENISA has been analysing AI risks for the last 5 years. To prepare for a secure and trusted AI, the safeguards need to be in place. Today AI and in particular machine learning pose great challenges to data protection and privacy. Trust is what underpins the secure adoption and maturity of these technologies. Personal data protection measures are an impactful way to gaining this trust.”

Wojciech Wiewiorowski, European Data Protection Supervisor: “It would be reductive to not look at the benefits that AI can bring to society, such as faster decision making and easy-to-use automation. However, the risks to individual rights are significant and can have a profound impact on our democracies. By proactively addressing these risks, we can harness the potential of AI while safeguarding privacy rights. It is crucial to take action now to ensure responsible and ethical implementation of AI technologies.”

Challenges and opportunities: the conference’s key take-aways

  • Within the three panel discussions, regulators from EU Institutions, France, Spain and Norway together with policy makers and industry practitioners, debated on which are the data protection engineering challenges for the years to come, what is the role of Data Protection Authorities in the artificial intelligence era and the data protection prospects and contemplations when processing medical data in the post pandemic era.
  • Further to these discussions, invited speakers also elaborated on the AI regulatory approaches on artificial intelligence across the two sides of the Atlantic and how Zero Knowledge Proof technique can be deployed as a privacy enhancing technique in real life applications.

The Annual Privacy Forum was co-located and organised back to back with the EDPS IPEN workshop as part of their strategic cooperation and the Memorandum of Understanding signed between ENISA and the EDPS in 2022.

 

 

Further Information

 

 

Relevant ENISA publications:

Other information:

 

 

About the Annual Privacy Forum

The Annual Privacy Forum (APF) has become a renowned forum among policy-makers, researchers and industry stakeholders in the area of privacy and personal data protection who join forces to advance information security. The forum is set against the EU legislative background that is mainly, but not exclusively, comprised of the GDPR and the draft ePrivacy Regulation. The event sets the stage for new research proposals, solutions, models, applications and policies. In the last few years, the forum has also developed a deeper industry footprint to complement its original research and policy orientation.

 

 

About the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)

The EU Agency for Cybersecurity has been working in the area of privacy and data protection since 2014, by analysing technical solutions for the implementation of the GDPR, privacy by design and security of personal data processing. The Agency has been providing guidance on data pseudonymisation solutions to data controllers and processors since 2018.

 

Contact

For press questions and interviews, please contact press (at) enisa.europa.eu

.

Av Svenn Dybvik - 24 april 2024 00:00

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/


The National Cyber Security Centre

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/problem-book/hardware-security


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud/using-cloud-services-securely/how-to-lift-and-shift-successfully


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/defending-democracy/guidance-for-high-risk-individuals


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/individuals-families


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/self-employed-sole-traders


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/small-medium-sized-organisations


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/large-organisations


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/public-sector


https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/cyber-security-professionals

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/defending-democracy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Defending democracy

Introduction

This collection brings together expanded guidance to raise awareness of the cyber threats to democratic processes, institutions, and the people involved in them. The aim is to prevent or reduce related attacks against both organisations and individuals.

The context here is the threat of foreign cyber interference with the aim of influencing UK democratic processes. Democratic events such as elections are attractive targets for adversaries, and organisations and individuals must be prepared for threats, old and new. Defending UK democratic institutions and processes is a priority.

 

Who is this guidance for?

Organisations

  • political parties or organisations, think tanks
  • local authorities, central government, devolved administrations

Individuals

  • working in organisations as above, that puts them at higher risk of targeting
  • working in IT or SOC roles in organisations as above

This collection contains

  1. Guidance for high-risk individuals

    There has been a rise in targeting of individuals’ personal accounts instead of corporate ones, as security is less likely to be managed by a dedicated team. This is not a mass campaign against the public but a persistent effort to target people whom attackers consider to hold information of interest. This guidance sets out how individuals can protect their accounts and devices.

Further guidance will be added to this collection in 2024.

 

 


Guidance for high-risk individuals on protecting your accounts and devices 


What is a high-risk individual?

In a cyber security context, you are considered a high-risk individual if your work or public status means you have access to, or influence over, sensitive information that could be of interest to nation state actors.

 

High-risk individuals include those working in political life (including elected representatives, candidates, activists and staffers), academia, journalism and the legal sector.

 

In recent years there have been a number of targeted cyber attacks against high-risk individuals in the UK, to attempt to gain access to their accounts and devices. This has resulted in the theft and publication of sensitive information, which can also cause reputational damage.



How and why you may be targeted

There are different ways an attacker may gain access to your accounts or devices. Spear-phishing is one method that attackers have used in the past to compromise high-risk individuals.

A joint NCSC advisory with international partners describes this technique and warns of a state actor that has targeted high-risk individuals in the UK in this way.



Using this guidance

This guidance will help you improve the security of personal accounts and devices, and keep you better protected online.

Personal accounts and devices are the responsibility of the individual and may be considered an easy target for threat actors, as they may perceive them to have fewer security measures in place.

 

As far as possible, you should continue to use corporately managed accounts and devices for your work, as they will be centrally managed and secured.



Protecting your accounts

Your personal accounts are a likely target for attackers. If an attacker gains access to one of your accounts, they may be able access to the information on them. Taking the actions below will significantly reduce the chance of a successful attack.

 


Use strong passwords 

When an attacker compromises an account, it is often because they have either stolen or guessed the password. Weak passwords are vulnerable to attack. Research shows that weak passwords often contain names, places or a run of numbers. The more complex a password is, the more secure it becomes. The NCSC recommends using a sequence of three random words to make a password complex but easy to remember.

Having strong passwords can lessen the chance that your account is compromised. Important accounts that contain sensitive information (such as your personal and work email, social media and online banking) should have a strong password that is unique to that account.

It can be difficult to remember passwords, so it’s fine to write them down and keep them safe where other people can’t access them, separate from your devices. You can also use a password manager. Password managers are a convenient and secure way to store your passwords, either in your browser or an app, which uses one ‘master’ password or biometrics. Both Android and iOS devices have secure and trusted password manager functions built in:

Accessing password manager functions on IOS (Apple)

Accessing password manager functions on Android

You should not share your passwords for any of your accounts. Password sharing heightens the risk of account compromise and weakens your online security.

 

Enable two-step verification on your accounts

Setting up two-step verification or 2SV (also known as multi-factor authentication or two-factor authentication) on an account makes it considerably more secure. It means that even if an attacker knows your password, they can’t access your account. It works by asking you to complete a second step when you sign in, usually by entering a code sent by SMS, email or via an app. Authentication apps such as Google Authenticator or Microsoft Authenticator are designed just for this purpose, and are more secure and convenient than SMS.

For some accounts, you can choose to only use 2SV when signing in from a new device or changing your password. This means you don’t have to enter a code every time you use a service.

Where should I set up 2SV?

You should set up 2SV on all personal accounts that could be considered a high-value target for an attacker, such as your email, messaging apps like WhatsApp, and social media. If 2SV isn’t available on an account, make sure it has a strong and unique password or consider changing to a service that offers 2SV.

The NCSC has separate guidance to help you set up 2SV.

Receiving 2SV requests

If you receive a 2SV request that asks if you are trying to access your account but you are not trying to log in, do not grant permission. It's possible that an attacker knows your password and is trying to access your account. In this instance, 2SV is doing its job, but you should change your password. If you use the same password on other accounts, you should change it for them too.

Never share an access code with others, even if prompted, as this can give attackers control of your account.

 


Review your social media use and settings 

Consider how much personal information you are sharing on social media. Attackers may use the information you post to engineer a spear-phishing attack and attempt to gain access to your account and data.

You should also consider maintaining separate professional and personal social media accounts.

You can review the privacy settings for each account to decide what is most appropriate for you. The major platforms provide instructions on how to manage your privacy settings. You can find links to these instructions in the NCSC guidance on using social media safely, alongside additional information on managing your digital footprint and spotting fake accounts.

Be aware that attackers may pose as other people on social media platforms, even if you appear to have mutual contacts. They may seek to cause you reputational damage, by sending you malicious links to click to gain access to sensitive information. It’s possible that over the next few years, attackers may also make increasing use of voice clones or ‘deep fakes’ to trick users to reveal sensitive information.

The UK National Protective Security Authority has guidance about false profiles that helps you spot them on social media and professional networking sites.

For any public social media accounts that you use in a professional context, consider using a social media management service. This means that colleagues or employees will be able to create posts for you without you sharing your passwords. You should avoid using the same password for the management service as any of your social media accounts connected to it. You can read the NCSC guidance on protecting what you publish for further information.



Review your use of messaging apps

Messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Messenger and Signal are now an important part of how we communicate in everyday life. It's important to use them securely and pay special attention when connecting with people professionally.

If you use a messaging app for personal use on a personal device, you should consider the following:

  • use disappearing messages that automatically delete after a set period – by turning this on you will limit what a successful attacker could access if they do manage to get in
  • consider the recipient – are they who they say they are, and who else is in the chat group?
  • avoid accepting message requests from unknown accounts – consider calling first to verify who they are

As with all apps, you should make sure that the latest security updates are installed and set up two-step verification (2SV) for when you log in.





Protecting your devices

As with your accounts, attackers may also try to compromise your devices – computers, phones or tablets – to achieve their aims. If they manage to access them, they can steal sensitive or personal information, carry out monitoring, or even impersonate you.

There are several things you can do to secure your devices.

 

Install updates

Installing security updates promptly is one of the most important things you can do to protect yourself from a cyber attack.

Out-of-date software, apps and operating systems often contain security vulnerabilities, and vendors regularly release updates to fix them. So if you receive a prompt to update your device or apps, you should do it, as it will prevent attackers taking advantage of these security flaws.

Most apps offer an auto-update option, meaning that updates will automatically download when they are available (or when you next connect to wifi), and install at the earliest time suitable for you, or the next time the device restarts. You should make sure this option is enabled on your device. You can read the NCSC guidance on software and app updates to help you enable automatic updates for popular devices and services.

You should only download software and apps from official stores, like Google Play or Apple App Store. They scan software for viruses before making it available, giving you more reassurance that what you’re downloading is safe

 


Use 'Lockdown Mode'

For additional security, you should consider enabling Lockdown Mode for your Apple devices. Lockdown Mode has been designed for individuals who might be targeted by sophisticated threat actors. On Windows devices, you have the option to enable ‘S mode’ which only allows applications from the Microsoft Store to be downloaded and installed. This prevents malicious programs running on your device.



Replace old devices

As older devices are replaced by newer models, vendors stop releasing security updates, making them more vulnerable to attack. You should avoid using devices that are no longer supported and upgrade your device if support is ending soon.

You can check to see if you device is still supported with the Which? phone support checker tool.


Protect physical access

You should protect your devices with a password or pin that must be entered when the device is powered on or restarted. This will help prevent someone who has managed to get physical access to your device accessing the information on it.

To unlock from standby, you can also use a password, PIN or a biometric, such as a fingerprint or facial recognition. Use whichever method you find convenient.

Avoid plugging your devices into public USB charging points, and instead use a traditional power plug.

Most devices come with a feature that allows you to track the location of a device and remotely wipe it if it's lost or stolen. On an iPhone, make sure Find My is turned on, and for Android devices, enable Find My Device.


Know how to erase data from devices

Our devices often contain sensitive work, personal and financial data, which can still be recovered even if the files have been deleted. So it's important to know how to erase the data if a device is lost or stolen, or you permanently give it to someone else to use. The NCSC has guidance to help you securely erase data on your devices.

 

 


What to do if you think you've been attacked

If you receive a suspicious email, do not click on any links, or reply to the email, until you're certain the sender is genuine. The NCSC has guidance on how to spot and deal with phishing emails.

If you receive a suspicious email you should report it to your organisation’s IT support team, who will be able to offer advice, even if has been sent to a personal account.

If you have clicked on a link, or think you’ve been hacked, don’t panic, even if you think you have made a mistake. If something goes wrong on a device or account that your organisation has provided, report it to IT support. The security team shouldn’t blame you for reporting that something has happened to you, as it helps them fix things, and try to stop it happening again, to you or anyone else.

 

 

 

 

 

 


Topics

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?topics=Device

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?topics=Personal%20data

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?topics=Social%20media

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/information-for/individuals-families

Individuals & families


  1. What is cyber security?
  2. Cyber Aware and staying secure online
  3. Dealing with common cyber problems
  4. Protecting your data and devices
  5. How to report cyber crim

What is cyber security?

Cyber security is the means by which individuals and organisations reduce the risk of being affected by cyber crime.

Cyber security's core function is to protect the devices we all use (smartphones, laptops, tablets and computers), and the services we access online - both at home and work - from theft or damage. It's also about preventing unauthorised access to the vast amounts of personal information we store on these devices, and online.

Cyber security is important because smartphones, computers and the internet are now such a fundamental part of modern life, that it's difficult to imagine how we'd function without them. From online banking and shopping, to email and social media, it's more important than ever to take steps that can prevent cyber criminals getting hold of our accounts, data, and devices.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cyber Aware and staying secure online

From banking to shopping, and streaming to social media, people are spending more time than ever online. Cyber Aware is the government's advice on how to stay secure online.

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberaware

 

 

 

 

 

 

Protecting your data and devices

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/data-breaches

How to protect yourself from the impact of data breaches
 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/buying-selling-second-hand-devices

How to erase the personal data from your phone, tablets, and other devices
 
 
How to protect 'smart' security cameras and baby monitors from cyber attack.
 
 
How to ensure your devices are as secure as possible.
 
 
How to set up and use video conferencing services, such as Zoom and Skype, safely and securely
 
 
A summary of what 5G is, how it will affect the UK and how the NCSC is helping to secure it.
 
 
How to enjoy online gaming securely by following just a few tips
 
 
How to shop safely online.
 
 
Detect and prevent malicious software and viruses on your computer or laptop.
 
 
Use privacy settings across social media platforms to manage your digital footprint.
 
 
Advice in response to the increase in sextortion scams
 
 
Many everyday items are now connected to the internet: we explain how to use them safely.

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/using-tls-to-protect-data


Using TLS to protect data

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 25 mars 2024 00:00

https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/index.cfm


Common Criteria

The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), and the companion Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM) are the technical basis for an international agreement, the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA), which ensures that:

  • Products can be evaluated by competent and independent licensed laboratories so as to determine the fulfilment of particular security properties, to a certain extent or assurance;
  • Supporting documents, are used within the Common Criteria certification process to define how the criteria and evaluation methods are applied when certifying specific technologies;
  • The certification of the security properties of an evaluated product can be issued by a number of Certificate Authorizing Schemes, with this certification being based on the result of their evaluation;
  • These certificates are recognized by all the signatories of the CCRA.

The CC is the driving force for the widest available mutual recognition of secure IT products. This web portal is available to support the information on the status of the CCRA, the CC and the certification schemes, licensed laboratories, certified products and related information, news and events.







https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/


The OWASP Top 10 is a standard awareness document for developers and web application security. It represents a broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications.

Globally recognized by developers as the first step towards more secure coding.

Companies should adopt this document and start the process of ensuring that their web applications minimize these risks. Using the OWASP Top 10 is perhaps the most effective first step towards changing the software development culture within your organization into one that produces more secure code.

Top 10 Web Application Security Risks

There are three new categories, four categories with naming and scoping changes, and some consolidation in the Top 10 for 2021.


  • A01:2021-Broken Access Control moves up from the fifth position; 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control. The 34 Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) mapped to Broken Access Control had more occurrences in applications than any other category.
  • A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures shifts up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which was broad symptom rather than a root cause. The renewed focus here is on failures related to cryptography which often leads to sensitive data exposure or system compromise.
  • A03:2021-Injection slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection, and the 33 CWEs mapped into this category have the second most occurrences in applications. Cross-site Scripting is now part of this category in this edition.
  • A04:2021-Insecure Design is a new category for 2021, with a focus on risks related to design flaws. If we genuinely want to “move left” as an industry, it calls for more use of threat modeling, secure design patterns and principles, and reference architectures.
  • A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration moves up from #6 in the previous edition; 90% of applications were tested for some form of misconfiguration. With more shifts into highly configurable software, it’s not surprising to see this category move up. The former category for XML External Entities (XXE) is now part of this category.
  • A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components was previously titled Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities and is #2 in the Top 10 community survey, but also had enough data to make the Top 10 via data analysis. This category moves up from #9 in 2017 and is a known issue that we struggle to test and assess risk. It is the only category not to have any Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVEs) mapped to the included CWEs, so a default exploit and impact weights of 5.0 are factored into their scores.
  • A07:2021-Identification and Authentication Failures was previously Broken Authentication and is sliding down from the second position, and now includes CWEs that are more related to identification failures. This category is still an integral part of the Top 10, but the increased availability of standardized frameworks seems to be helping.
  • A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures is a new category for 2021, focusing on making assumptions related to software updates, critical data, and CI/CD pipelines without verifying integrity. One of the highest weighted impacts from Common Vulnerability and Exposures/Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVE/CVSS) data mapped to the 10 CWEs in this category. Insecure Deserialization from 2017 is now a part of this larger category.
  • A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures was previously Insufficient Logging & Monitoring and is added from the industry survey (#3), moving up from #10 previously. This category is expanded to include more types of failures, is challenging to test for, and isn’t well represented in the CVE/CVSS data. However, failures in this category can directly impact visibility, incident alerting, and forensics.
  • A10:2021-Server-Side Request Forgery is added from the Top 10 community survey (#1). The data shows a relatively low incidence rate with above average testing coverage, along with above-average ratings for Exploit and Impact potential. This category represents the scenario where the security community members are telling us this is important, even though it’s not illustrated in the data at this time.

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=critical%20national%20infrastructure%20(cni)&sort=date%2Bdesc

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

National assets that are essential for the functioning of society, such as those associated with energy supply, water supply, transportation, health and telecommunications.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=artificial%20intelligence&sort=date%2Bdesc

Artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) describes computer systems which can perform tasks usually requiring human intelligence. This could include visual perception, speech recognition or translation between languages.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=social%20media&sort=date%2Bdesc

Social media

Websites and apps, such as Facebook, X and Instragram, that allow people to share and respond to user-generated content (text posts, photos and video).

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=cloud&sort=date%2Bdesc

Cloud

An on-demand, massively scalable service, hosted on shared infrastructure, accessible via the internet. Typical services include providing data storage, data processing, and pre-built functionality, such as logging.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=cyber%20strategy&sort=date%2Bdesc

Cyber strategy

A long-term plan of action with the aim of implementing cyber security.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=asset%20management&sort=date%2Bdesc

Asset management

Identifying and recording of an organisation's physical assets, software, data, essential staff and utilities.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=configuration%20management&sort=date%2Bdesc

Configuration management

Processes for defining and maintaining the consistency of configurations of software, hardware and other elements of an organisation to ensure reliable performance through its life.

 

 

 

 

 

 

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics?allTopics=true&topics=device&sort=date%2Bdesc

Device

Computer-based hardware that physically exists, such as a desktop computer, smartphone or tablet.

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 24 februari 2024 00:00

NATO

(Cognitive Warfare)

https://www.act.nato.int/activities/cognitive-warfare/


Designed to modify perceptions of reality, whole-of-society manipulation has become a new norm, with human cognition shaping to be a critical realm of warfare.

 

Cognitive Warfare focuses on attacking and degrading rationality, which can lead to exploitation of vulnerabilities and systemic weakening. However, this becomes increasingly complex as non-military targets are involved. An example: Russian social media and public information operations targeted much of the international community in an attempt to label Ukraine as being at fault. Through a combination of communication technologies, fake news stories, and perceptions manipulation, Russia aims to influence public opinion, as well as decay public trust towards open information sources. These narratives have extensive reach, and often involve both offensive and defensive posturing.

China, as a strategic competitor for NATO, describes Cognitive Warfare as the use of public opinion, psychological operations, and legal influence to achieve victory. Combat psychology has significant impact on the warfighter’s ability to function; Intelligent Psychological Monitoring System, a recent smart sensor bracelets developed by China, focuses on recording facial information, emotional changes, and psychological states of soldiers to determine their combat status. Outside of the battlefield, influence can also affect law, rule-of-order, and civil constructs. This inclusion of “Lawfare” and the targeting of broader community sentiment has significant impact, since so many civilians and non-combatants are potentially exposed.


Allied Command Transformation manages the Cognitive Warfare Exploratory Concept, which is part of the larger Warfare Development Agenda. Synchronization of adversarial effects against emotional and subconscious domains are increasing; understanding frameworks, definitions, impacts, and risks enables better political decision making, military capability development, and overall Alliance-wide security. Allied Command Transformation educates, collaborates, protects, and shapes NATO forces on the topic of Cognitive Warfare, providing guidance on awareness, civil-military cooperation, societal resilience, and data sharing for the Alliance’s current and future security considerations.







Cognitive Warfare: Strengthening and Defending the Mind

https://www.act.nato.int/article/cognitive-warfare-strengthening-and-defending-the-mind/

What does Cognitive Warfare really mean?

 

Cognitive, deriving from cognition, is the mental action or process of understanding, encompassing all aspects of intellectual function, including the sub-conscious and emotional aspects that drive a majority of human decision-making. Warfare, as the “experience” of war, originally referred to common activities and characteristics of armed conflict between states, governments, or entities. In the modern landscape, there is less clarity on stakeholders, as varying degrees of organizational, cultural, and social involvement are becoming more commonplace, as well as proxy extension of national interest.


Together, these two words paint a definition of Cognitive Warfare: the activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing, protecting, and/or disrupting individual and group cognitions to gain an advantage. These activities vary greatly, and may encompass supporting or conflicting cultural or personalized components – social psychology, Game Theory, and ethics are all contributing factors. However, activities of modern warfare do not necessarily carry a kinetic component or directly tangible outcomes, such as territorial or resource acquisition – as with other hybrid threats, our adversaries conduct Cognitive Warfare throughout the continuum of conflict, and aim to stay in the ‘Gray Zone’ below the threshold of armed conflict.


An ongoing example: Russia launched a kinetic, military invasion of Ukraine, reinforced with non-kinetic activities such as targeted propaganda, disinformation campaigns, and support from its partners. Some of these non-kinetic, Cognitive Warfare activities are obvious and direct: receivers of Russian aligned disinformation experience deterioration in their ability to identify fact from fiction, decaying their mental resilience, and with potential long-term impact, such as loss of trust in media.


Other instances are not as clear: China leverages official and party-aligned influence to manipulate and control their domestic information environment, which results in cognitive biases development. A secondary effect presents: other nation’s citizens also develop cognitive biases towards Chinese mainland citizens and their collective disconnect with external information, which produces two fundamentally opposed perceptions of reality. This form of “us vs. them” polarization can lead to increasing marginalization and exclusion of populations, as well as emotional exploitation, which contributes to China’s Cognitive Warfare strategy.


Cognitive Warfare integrates cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities. These activities, conducted in synchronization with other Instruments of Power, can affect attitudes and behaviour by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary. Multidisciplinary experts at Allied Command Transformation are developing concepts aimed at protecting the Alliance against the threat of Cognitive Warfare – NATO will Educate, Collaborate, Protect, and Shape to equip nations to protect their core democratic values.







kognitiv krigfĝring

https://www.ffi.no/aktuelt/nyheter/kjemiske-stoffer-og-kognitiv-krigforing

https://www.ffi.no/aktuelt/podkaster/kort-forklart-hva-er-kognitiv-krigforing


https://www.ffi.no/aktuelt/nyheter/ny-ffi-rapport-avdekker-falske-nettaviser

https://www.ffi.no/aktuelt/kronikker/gjor-neppe-norge-mer-robust-mot-pavirkningsoperasjoner

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 25 januari 2024 00:00

NATO releases first ever quantum strategy

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221601.htm?selectedLocale=en


Quantum technologies are getting closer to revolutionizing the world of innovation and can be game-changers for security, including modern warfare. Ensuring that the Alliance is ''quantum-ready'' is the aim of NATO’s first-ever quantum strategy that was approved by NATO Foreign Ministers on 28 November. On Wednesday (17 January 2024), NATO released a summary of the strategy.


The strategy outlines how quantum can be applied to defence and security in areas such as sensing, imaging, precise positioning, navigation and timing, improve the detection of submarines, and upgrade and secure data communications using quantum resistant cryptography. 

Many of these technologies are already used in the private sector and have become the subject of strategic competition. NATO’s quantum strategy helps foster and guide NATO’s cooperation with industry to develop a transatlantic quantum technologies ecosystem, while preparing NATO to defend itself against the malicious use of quantum technologies.

Quantum is one of the technological areas that NATO Allies have prioritized due to their implications for defence and security. These include artificial intelligence, data and computing, autonomy, biotechnology and human enhancements, hypersonic technologies, energy and propulsion, novel materials, next-generation communications networks and space.

Quantum technologies are already part of NATO’s innovation efforts. Six of the 44 companies selected to join NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)’s programme are specialised in quantum. Their innovations are expected to help progress in the areas of next-generation cryptography, develop high-speed lasers to improve satellite connectivity, and deploy quantum-enhanced 3-D imaging sensors in challenging undersea environments. DIANA also anticipates quantum technologies forming a key part of solutions to its future challenge programme. 

Building on its new strategy, NATO will now start work to establish a Transatlantic Quantum Community to engage with government, industry and academia from across the innovation ecosystems.







Summary of NATO’s Quantum Technologies Strategy

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_221777.htm

 


Introduction

  1. Recent advancements in quantum technologies are bringing us closer to a profound shift for science and technology – one that will have far-reaching implications for our economies, security and defence. These technologies could revolutionise sensing; imaging; precise positioning, navigation and timing; communications; computing; modelling; simulation; and information science. Quantum technologies have potentially revolutionary and disruptive implications, which can degrade the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend. Quantum technologies are therefore an element of strategic competition.
     
  2. Quantum technologies have the potential to offer capabilities in computing, communications and situational awareness that are unparalleled to technology currently available to the Alliance and that could constitute a significant strategic advantage. However, quantum technologies can equally enable our strategic competitors and potential adversaries.

 

Strategic Vision: A Quantum-ready Alliance

  1. To become a quantum-ready Alliance, NATO and Allies will foster the development of a secure, resilient and competitive quantum ecosystem that is able to respond to the fast pace of technological competition in the quantum industry. This requires coherence in investment, cooperation among Allies in technology development opportunities, development and protection of skilled workforce, and increased situational awareness as well as information sharing. It will also require development and deployment of critical enabling technologies that quantum technologies require. It is equally important to deter and defend our own systems and networks against quantum-enabled and other attacks.
     
  2. To achieve the strategic ambition of becoming a quantum-ready Alliance, NATO and Allies will harness quantum technologies in support of the Alliance’s core tasks, driving toward the following desired outcomes:
  • Allies and NATO have identified the most promising military and dual-use quantum applications, experiments, and integration of quantum technologies that meet defence planning and capability development requirements;
  • NATO has developed, adopted and implemented frameworks, policies and standards for both software and hardware to enhance interoperability;
  • Allies have cooperated in the development of quantum technologies with a view to maintain NATO’s technological edge and Allies’ abilities in the field;
  • NATO has identified, understood and capitalised on evolving quantum technologies advancements, including with enabling technologies and in convergence with other EDTs;
  • NATO has a Transatlantic Quantum Community to strategically engage with government, industry and academia from across our innovation ecosystems;
  • NATO has transitioned its cryptographic systems to quantum-safe cryptography;
  • Relevant quantum strategies, policies and action plans are dynamically updated and executed; and
  • Allies have become aware of, and act to prevent, on a voluntary basis, adversarial investments and interference into our quantum ecosystems, which can include, on a national basis, the examination of relevant supply chains.
  1. Further, NATO will provide the leading transatlantic forum for quantum technologies in defence and security, helping to continuously build on our shared understanding, and leveraging the potential of quantum technologies while safeguarding against its adversarial use.

 

Fostering a Quantum-Ready Alliance

  1. Allies and NATO must urgently accelerate the development of quantum technologies that can augment our capabilities, as well as prevent the formation of new capability gaps in a world where peer competitors adopt quantum technologies themselves. Given the dual-use nature of quantum technologies, this advantage can only be achieved if done in close cooperation with Allied quantum ecosystems. Allies and NATO must adopt a ‘learn-by-doing’ approach to integrating quantum technologies considerations in the implementation of our operational concepts, defence planning cycles, capability development cycles, and standardisation efforts.
     
  2. As DIANA and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) become fully operational, their deep-tech activities will also inform NATO’s strategic approach to quantum technologies and reinforce NATO’s engagement with the Allied quantum ecosystem.
     
  3. The convergence between quantum technologies and other EDTs brings important defence and security implications, and potential military applications and capabilities. Examples include using quantum sensors to improve space-based data collection and to enable positioning, navigation and timing capabilities without having to rely on Global Navigation Satellite Systems.
     
  4. NATO recognises that one of the most critical resources in the pursuit of quantum advantage is talent, which will be a critical determinant of the Alliance’s future trajectory in this domain. As quantum technologies gain traction, so will the demand for experts with advanced degrees in the field.

 

Responsible Innovation

  1. While quantum technologies have less obvious ethical implications relative to other EDTs such as AI, autonomy or biotechnology and human enhancement, Allies and NATO are nevertheless committed to instituting a responsible approach to quantum technologies innovation. This will cover three main areas: links to data privacy, anticipation of international norms development, and sustainability considerations.
     
  2. NATO committees will also serve as platforms for Allies to exchange and cohere views on burgeoning quantum-related norms in international security, as they develop. Allies will exchange views at NATO, in line with this Strategy, and in light of other international fora.
     
  3. To inform a comprehensive treatment of the risks and opportunities of the field of quantum technologies, the Data and AI Review Board (DARB) can offer its advice on the implications of developments in data and AI for quantum technologies.

 

A Transatlantic Quantum Community

  1. A quantum-ready Alliance requires, first and foremost, a closer cooperation among Allies, and a resilient quantum ecosystem that extends beyond availability of appropriate funding. Successful scale up and adoption of quantum technologies also depends on availability of enabling technologies and effective links between new research breakthroughs and engineering methods. Quantum technologies are particularly reliant on enabling technologies. For example, quantum computers require precise metrology tools, secure manufacturing capabilities of specialised manufacturing and cryogenics.
     
  2. End users and defence industry leaders play a crucial role in translating promising quantum technologies use cases into capabilities at scale. NATO is uniquely positioned to broker opportunities made possible by EDTs with industry, governments, and end users. The fast pace of development of quantum technologies calls for a coherent approach to this type of coordination and alignment among Allies, which will be provided by the establishment of a Transatlantic Quantum Community.

 

Protecting the Alliance from the Quantum Threat

  1. Quantum technologies have a double-edged impact on cyber security and defence, benefitting both the defensive as well as the offensive side. If fully adopted, functional quantum technologies would allow private and public actors in the Alliance to better protect their data and communications in a way that is fast and reliable. A quantum-ready Alliance will be better able to detect and block potential incursions in cyberspace.
     
  2. A functional quantum computer would also have the ability to break current cryptographic protocols.
     
  3. Today, post-quantum cryptography is an important approach to secure communications against quantum-enabled attacks. In the future, further improvements could allow quantum key distribution to also contribute to secure communications.
     
  4. Through NATO committees and bodies Allies can support each other, and the NATO Enterprise, in the development and implementation of post-quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution to enhance the quantum-resilience of our networks. NATO will continue to support research into the transition to quantum-safe communications across air, space, cyber, land and maritime domains.
     
  5. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries may also leverage disinformation opportunities within Allied societies by creating public distrust of the military use of quantum technologies. Allies will seek to prevent and counter any such efforts through the use of strategic communications. NATO will support Allies as required.

 

OFFICIAL TEXTS

 

 

 

Topics







Using quantum technologies to make communications secure

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207634.htm


Innovative projects led by scientists in NATO and partner countries are breaking new ground to harness the power of quantum to make communications impossible to intercept and hack. The application of these quantum technologies in the security and defence sectors could help to future-proof the transmission of information, protecting it from increasingly advanced hacking systems and contributing to NATO’s efforts to maintain its technological edge.


NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme research and development projects have been examining the security-related applications of quantum technologies, addressing their three main fields: computing, sensing and communications. Quantum computing and sensing are improving the abilities of computer and remote measurement technologies to levels that they are not traditionally able to achieve. In the field of quantum communications, SPS activities are showing the most promising results. These projects develop systems for the encryption and secure transmission of information using quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Through these techniques, they respond to rising security concerns related to new technologies – such as quantum computers, which can decipher secret communications – by preventing unauthorised access.

 

Testing quantum key distribution (QKD)

QKD is a quantum communication method to share decryption keys. In this system, an encrypted message is sent over traditional networks, while the keys to decrypt the information are transmitted through quantum means. This way, only the intended recipient can decode the message, making any eavesdropping impossible. By applying this method, an SPS project succeeded in connecting Italy and Malta with a prototypical QKD link using submarine optical fibre cables for the first time.

 

Another SPS-supported research initiative investigated QKD techniques to send cryptographic keys from one endpoint to another, which was located hundreds of kilometres away. Meanwhile, researchers at a university in the Czech Republic are studying the application of QKD technology on a 5G network to explore its potential to enhance cyber security in future communication systems.

 


Demonstrating post-quantum cryptography (PQC)

Unlike QKD, which uses physical quantum properties to protect information, PQC uses cryptography and mathematical functions as an alternative approach to secure communications. An international group of scientists supported by SPS recently demonstrated that, using PQC, it is possible to securely transmit information without the possibility of decryption by a hacker, even one who has a quantum computer. Through a secure protocol, five research groups based in Malta, Slovakia, Spain, the United States and NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, succeeded in communicating in a completely secure space, free from the risk of intrusion.

 

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, agreed by Allies at the 2022 Madrid Summit, recognises the critical role of technology, and in particular, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), in shaping the future of the Alliance. To explore the potential and risks associated with EDTs, the SPS Programme is supporting research activities that address technological trends in EDTs, like artificial intelligence, autonomy, bioengineering, and especially quantum technologies. Future SPS activities investigating quantum will look at how to integrate both QKD and PQC to secure information infrastructure in the best and most holistic way for the Alliance.







Introduction to Quantum Computing in Fluid Dynamics

 

 

STO-EN-AVT-377 

 

Published 11/27/2023 
Author(s) Multiple 
STOPublicationType Educational Notes RDP 
Publication Reference STO-EN-AVT-377 
DOI 10.14339/STO-EN-AVT-377 
ISBN ISBN 978-92-837-2405-6 
STOPublisher STO 
Access Open Access 
STOKeywords

 

 


Type
Open Menu
Name
Open Menu
Title
Open Menu
Published
 
Access
 
$EN-AVT-377-Cover.pdf$EN-AVT-377-CoverCover Pages11/27/2023Open Access
EN-AVT-377-01.pdfEN-AVT-377-01An Introduction to Algorithms in Quantum Computation of Fluid Dynamics5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-02.pdfEN-AVT-377-02Grover’s Algorithm & Quantum Monte Carlo Integration5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-05.pdfEN-AVT-377-05Key Challenges & Prospects for Quantum Computational Fluid Dynamics5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-06.pdfEN-AVT-377-06Quantum Linear PDE Solution Methods5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-07.pdfEN-AVT-377-07Quantum Lattice-Based Modelling & Future Developments5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-08.pdfEN-AVT-377-08Classical Lattice-Boltzmann Methods for fluid dynamics5/17/2022Open Access
EN-AVT-377-09.pdfEN-AVT-377-09Towards quantum lattice-Boltzmann methods5/17/2022Open Access

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 27 december 2023 00:00

Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)

NATO - Topic: Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)


The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is a NATO body working with leading researchers and entrepreneurs across the Alliance, helping them develop technologies to keep NATO populations safe and secure. With dozens of accelerator sites and test centres across the Alliance, DIANA brings together universities, industry and governments to work with start-ups and other innovators to solve critical defence and security challenges.

 

  • At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allied Leaders agreed to launch DIANA to foster transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability among Allied forces and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector.
  • A year later, at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, all Allied Leaders endorsed the charter for DIANA and unveiled its initial footprint of test centres and accelerator sites.
  • DIANA exists to harness the opportunities presented by emerging and disruptive technologies, boosting NATO’s competitive edge in collective defence and security. Developing new capabilities will improve the Alliance’s ability to respond to conventional threats – and to the threats posed via these technologies themselves.
  • Specific technological areas of interest to DIANA include artificial intelligence (AI), autonomy, quantum technologies, biotechnologies and human enhancement, hypersonic systems, space, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.
  • DIANA has a regional office in London, United Kingdom. Another regional office is being set up in Halifax, Canada, and a regional hub will soon open in Tallinn, Estonia. In addition, DIANA leverages a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and 90 test centres across the Alliance.

DIANA works by running competitive industry challenges. Each challenge is based on a critical defence and security problem, and asks innovators to develop deep tech dual-use technologies (i.e., technologies that are focused on commercial markets and uses, but may also have defence and security applications) to help solve it.

 

Innovators selected into DIANA’s programmes receive non-dilutive grants (i.e. investment capital that does not require them to give up equity or ownership in their company) and gain access to accelerator sites and test centres across the Alliance. DIANA’s accelerator sites are based at facilities or organisations that have been selected by Allies to implement the unique DIANA dual-use (commercial/defence and security) acceleration curricula. DIANA’s test centres are laboratories, testbeds or field environments that are available for testing, evaluation, validation and verification of technologies developed by innovators selected into DIANA's challenge programmes. Accelerator sites and test centres are based in existing universities and research centres in Europe and North America, which have applied to join DIANA through their national Ministries of Defence.

 

Innovators also have access to a network of mentors (scientists, engineers, industry experts, end-users and government procurement experts) and a community of trusted investors. Lastly, DIANA offers pathways to market both within NATO as an organization and with NATO Allies, connecting innovators with Allied military and governmental end-users who will work with the selected companies to help them adapt their solutions to Allied military needs.

Technologies developed through DIANA may also receive funding from the NATO Innovation Fund, a EUR 1 billion venture capital fund established by a group of NATO Allies at the 2022 Madrid Summit. The world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund, it will invest its funding over a 15-year period in start-ups developing or adapting technologies for defence and security. The Fund will prioritise investments in companies accelerated through DIANA that are headquartered in any of the countries participating in the Fund (which currently includes 23 NATO Allies: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Türkiye and the United Kingdom).

 

DIANA launched its first three pilot challenge programmes in 2023. Once fully operational in 2025, DIANA will have the capacity to work with hundreds of innovators each year across an even wider network of accelerator sites and test centres throughout the Alliance.

DIANA’s Board of Directors, which held its first meeting in October 2022, is responsible for the organisational governance of DIANA. It is led by a Board Chair and is composed of one representative from each NATO member country. DIANA operates under a North Atlantic Council-approved charter and reports to the Council on its activities.

 

Evolution

June 2021
At the 2021 Brussels Summit, as part of the NATO 2030 agenda, NATO Heads of State and Government agree to launch DIANA to foster transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability among Allied forces and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector.

 

April 2022
NATO Foreign Ministers endorse the charter for DIANA, which outlines its mission and strategy; legal authorities; financial mechanism; governance; and the regional offices, accelerator sites and test centres that will make up its initial footprint.

 

April 2022
The NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (an independent group of 12 experts from the private sector and academia, which provides external advice to NATO on how it can optimise its innovation efforts) delivers its second annual report, for 2021. The report examines the progress made on setting up DIANA and describes how it and other initiatives are signs of real action towards technological readiness at NATO.

 

June 2022
At the 2022 Madrid Summit, all NATO Leaders endorse the charter for DIANA and unveil its initial footprint of test centres and accelerator sites.

 

March 2023
DIANA opens its European regional office at the Imperial College London Innovation Hub in London, United Kingdom.

 

June 2023
DIANA launches its first three pilot challenge programmes, inviting innovators to apply to its programmes.

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 27 november 2023 00:00

Countering terrorism

NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism


Terrorism is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity. A persistent global issue that knows no border, nationality or religion, terrorism is a challenge that the international community must tackle together. NATO will continue to fight this threat with determination and in full solidarity. NATO’s work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors.

 

  • NATO invoked its collective defence clause (Article 5) for the first and only time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States.
  • NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.
  • NATO’s counter-terrorism work spans across the Alliance’s three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.
  • A comprehensive action plan defines and determines NATO’s role in the international community’s fight against terrorism.
  • A Terrorism Intelligence Cell has been established at NATO Headquarters.
  • The NATO Secretary General’s Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism serves as the high-level focal point for all of NATO’s work on counter-terrorism and ensures that NATO’s response to terrorism remains strong, effective and coherent. 
  • NATO advises and assists Iraqi security forces and institutions through NATO Mission Iraq and is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.
  • NATO supports the development of new capabilities and technologies to tackle the terrorist threat and to manage the consequences of a terrorist attack.
  • NATO cooperates with partners and international organisations to leverage the full potential of each stakeholder engaged in the global counter-terrorism effort.
  • The Alliance’s Strategic Concept recognises terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity.





Awareness

In support of national authorities, NATO ensures shared awareness of the terrorist threat through consultations, enhanced intelligence-sharing and continuous strategic analysis and assessment.

 

Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies’ intelligence services, both internal and external, civilian and military. The way NATO handles sensitive information has gradually evolved based on successive summit decisions and continuing reform of intelligence structures since 2010. Since 2017, the Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO benefits from increased sharing of intelligence between member services and the Alliance, and produces strategic analytical reports relating to terrorism and its links with other transnational threats.

Intelligence-sharing between NATO and partner countries’ agencies continues through the Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and an intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. An intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters improves how NATO shares intelligence, including on foreign fighters.

 

NATO faces a range of threats arising from instability in the region to the south of the Alliance. NATO increases its understanding of these challenges and improves its ability to respond to them through the ‘Hub for the South’ based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. The Hub collects and analyses information, assesses potential threats and engages with partner countries and organisations.

 

Recognising the many different roles that men and women may play in terrorist groups, NATO is also seeking to integrate a gender perspective in all its counter-terrorism efforts, including training and education for Allies and partners, as well as policy and programme development. Likewise, the Alliance seeks to address all pillars of the human security agenda (including protection of civilians, preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, countering trafficking in human beings, protection of children in armed conflict, cultural property protection) in its counter-terrorism work. 

 

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced the position of Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in October 2023. The Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism serves as the high-level focal point for all of NATO’s work on counter-terrorism and ensures that NATO’s response to terrorism remains strong, effective and coherent. The current Special Coordinator is Assistant Secretary General for Operations Tom Goffus. 

 

Capabilities

The Alliance strives to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats. Capability development and work on innovative technologies are part of NATO’s core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats, including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance. Much of this work is conducted through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which facilitates the development of capabilities to protect NATO forces, civilians and territory against attacks by terrorists, including those using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances. NATO’s Centres of Excellence (COEs) are important contributors to many projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including technical exploitation, battlefield evidence, explosive ordnance disposal, military engineering, counter-IED, and network analysis and modelling.

 

NATO policies and practical frameworks in areas such as C-UAS, biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation also drive capability development in areas relevant to counter-terrorism. 

 

Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work

The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW) was developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and approved by NATO Leaders at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. With an initial focus on technological solutions to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks, the programme has since widened its scope to support comprehensive capability development. It now includes exercises, trials, development of prototypes and concepts, doctrine, policy, equipment, training and lessons learned, and interoperability demonstrations. The key aim of the DAT POW is to prevent non-conventional attacks, such as attacks with IEDs and UAS, and mitigate other challenges, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and the use of emerging and disruptive technologies by terrorists.

 

The DAT POW is based on the principle of common funding, whereby member countries pool resources within a NATO framework. Under the DAT POW, individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member countries and NATO bodies, lead projects to develop advanced technologies or counter-measures that meet the most urgent security needs in the face of terrorism and other asymmetric threats.

 

Most projects under the programme focus on finding solutions that can be fielded in the short term and that respond to the military needs of the Alliance – although the DAT POW also bridges the gap between long-term military requirements and urgent operational needs. The programme uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats, covering a wide range of areas, including countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), biometrics, technical exploitation and countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED). The DAT POW is an integral contributor to NATO activities in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies, such as data, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems.. Through this programme, NATO is consulting with stakeholders from industry, the military and academia to explore how new technologies can be leveraged in the fight against terrorism.

 

Protection of harbours and ports

The safe and uninterrupted functioning of harbours and ports is critical to the global economy and it is essential for maritime assets to be made as secure as possible. The DAT POW supports the development of technologies that enhance maritime protection. This includes sensor nets, electro-optical detectors, rapid-reaction capabilities, underwater magnetic barriers and unmanned underwater vehicles. In 2022, under the leadership of France, the DAT POW supported the third iteration of "Cut Away", a multinational harbour exploration and clearance exercise.

Additionally, under the lead of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) located in La Spezia, Italy, the DAT POW supports the use of advanced and immersive visualisation media (virtual and augmented reality) to enhance situational and spatial awareness in countering maritime IED threats in harbour protection.

 

Countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats

NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems to state and non-state actors, including terrorists. Ideally, terrorists will be prevented from acquiring and using such weapons, but should prevention fail, NATO is committed to defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Allied forces, territory and populations, and to supporting recovery efforts.

 

The NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force is designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of CBRN agents. The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in Czechia further enhances NATO’s capabilities. The DAT POW has also supported the Joint CBRN Defence COE in establishing and enhancing the NATO CBRN Reachback Capability, ensuring that CBRN expertise is available to the NATO Command Structure and Allied forces in theatres of operations.

 

The DAT POW also covers projects on the detection, identification and monitoring of CBRN substances, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management and CBRN medical counter-measures. Furthermore, the DAT POW facilitates training and exercises, including those conducted with live agents.

 

Explosive ordnance disposal and consequence management

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians are experts in detecting, rendering safe and disposing of dangerous weapons like landmines, IEDs and explosive remnants of war. The DAT POW supports EOD demonstrations and trials, led by the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trencin, Slovakia, as well as the exercising of high-end EOD capabilities in the annual exercise Northern Challenge in Iceland. With DAT POW support, the EOD community has also tested integrated exoskeletons that technicians can wear to protect themselves while undertaking this dangerous work. The integration of emerging technologies such as augmented reality into EOD training is another DAT POW priority. The strong community of interest includes experts from partner countries, such as the Irish Defence Forces' Ordnance School.

 

Countering improvised explosive devices (C-IED)

NATO must remain prepared to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority. Several NATO bodies are leading the Alliance’s efforts on countering IEDs, including the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. Various technologies to counter IEDs have been explored, particularly stand-off detection, the integration of innovative materials into protective coatings for vehicles and buildings and the use of artificial intelligence to fuse massive quantities of sensor data in order to detect suicide bombers. The DAT POW supports the annual Northern Challenge exercise, led by Iceland, which tests counter-IED and IED disposal abilities. The biennial Thor's Hammer electronic counter-measures trial series and the radio-controlled IED database are two innovative approaches regularly supported by the DAT POW, which are now also being leveraged to assist with countering unmanned aircraft systems. 

 

Countering unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS)

Terrorists have sought to use and manipulate various technologies in their operations, including easily available off-the-shelf technology. Drones, in particular, have been identified as a threat. Therefore, in February 2019, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems. A new programme of work to help coordinate approaches and identify additional steps to address this threat was agreed in 2023 and is currently being implemented. 

 

NATO is also developing a C-UAS doctrine, which is expected to be adopted by the end of 2023.The DAT POW supports comprehensive capability development in the field of C-UAS through tests, evaluation, exercises, concept development and technical standardization. In 2021, the DAT POW supported an innovation challenge for the development of artificial intelligence / machine learning techniques to track, classify and identify drones as they fly within a defined area. At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, a technology display for Heads of State and Government covered some of the latest challenges related to C-UAS and exploitation capabilities. 

 

Biometrics, battlefield evidence and technical exploitation

NATO is also addressing the use of information obtained on missions and operations. In 2018, Allies agreed a biometric data policy, consistent with applicable national and international law and subject to national requirements and restrictions. The policy enables biometric data collection to support NATO operations, based upon a mandate from the North Atlantic Council – NATO’s top political decision-making body. Furthermore, NATO's Strategic Commands have recognised that developing and improving this capability is a military requirement. The policy is particularly relevant to force protection and the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 highlights the acute and growing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and “urges Member States to expeditiously exchange information, through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms and in accordance with domestic and international law, concerning the identity of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.”

 

In October 2020, the NATO Battlefield Evidence Policy was approved. It aims to facilitate the sharing of information obtained on NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. While the primary purpose of deployed military is to fulfil their operational objectives, troops often collect information or material on the battlefield, some of which may also be useful to support legal proceedings, including the prosecution of returning foreign terrorist fighters. In this regard, the policy also supports Allies in fulfilling their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 in holding foreign fighters accountable. Cooperation with other international organisations, including the United Nations, INTERPOL and the European Union, is an important aspect of NATO’s work on battlefield evidence to ensure complementarity and added value. Since July 2021, NATO also has a Battlefield Evidence Programme of Work in place to guide the implementation of the Policy. Moreover, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence is providing a series of hands-on battlefield evidence training courses to law enforcement and military from partner countries in the region to the south of the Alliance.

Also in October 2020, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation was agreed. Technical exploitation collects material that has been in the possession of terrorists and other adversaries – such as weapons, computers and cell phones – and uses scientific tools and analysis to support the identification of actors, their capabilities and intentions. It enables NATO forces to derive important information and intelligence from material and materiel collected on the battlefield to support military objectives, protect our forces or support law enforcement outcomes such as battlefield evidence. In June 2022, the first NATO Martial Vision Technical Exploitation Experiment took place in Burgos, Spain to test and assess relevant technical exploitation doctrine. Further experimentation and concept development are underway to ensure that NATO has the ability to derive operational and intelligence information from this valuable resource.

 

Operations and missions

As part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence, NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts extend through a variety of operations and missions, both within NATO territory and beyond the Alliance’s borders.

Since 2017, NATO has been a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. As a member of the Coalition, NATO has been playing a key role in the fight against international terrorism, including through its former operational engagement in Afghanistan, through intelligence-sharing and through its work with partners with a view to projecting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied Leaders agreed to provide direct support to the Global Coalition through the provision of NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft. The first patrols of NATO AWACS aircraft, operating from Konya Airfield in Türkiye, started in October 2016.

In February 2018, following a request by the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition, the Alliance decided to launch NATO Mission Iraq, a non-combat advisory and capacity-building mission. Its aim is to strengthen Iraqi security forces and institutions so that they are better able to prevent the return of Daesh/ISIS, to fight terrorism and to stabilise the country. In February 2021, Allied Defence Ministers, and in August 2023 the North Atlantic Council, agreed to expand the scope of the mission at the request of the Iraqi government. NATO operates in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and coordinates and consults closely with other international partners like the Global Coalition, the United Nations and the European Union.

 

NATO also takes part in counter-terrorism in the high seas. NATO’s operation Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime security operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, including countering terrorism at sea if required. Currently, Sea Guardian operates in the Mediterranean Sea. It succeeded Operation Active Endeavour, which was launched in 2001 under Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty as part of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks to deter, detect and, if necessary, disrupt the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Active Endeavour was terminated in October 2016.

Many other operations have had relevance to international counter-terrorism efforts. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which began in 2003 and came to an end in 2014 - helped the government to expand its authority and implement security to prevent the country from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. Following the end of ISAF, NATO launched the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. In April 2021, the Allies decided to start the withdrawal of RSM forces by 1 May 2021 and the mission was terminated in early September 2021.

 

Crisis management

NATO’s long-standing work on civil preparedness, critical infrastructure protection and crisis management provides a resource that may serve both Allies and partners upon request. This field can relate directly to counter-terrorism, building resilience and ensuring appropriate planning and preparation for response to and recovery from terrorist acts.

National authorities are primarily responsible for protecting their populations and critical infrastructure against the consequences of terrorist attacks, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents and natural disasters. NATO can assist countries by developing non-binding advice and minimum standards and acting as a forum to exchange best practices and lessons learned to improve preparedness and national resilience. NATO has developed guidelines for enhancing civil-military cooperation in response to a CBRN incident and organises international courses for trainers of first responders to CBRN incidents. NATO guidance can also advise national authorities on warning the general public and alerting emergency responders. NATO can call on an extensive network of civil experts, from government and industry, to help respond to requests for assistance. Its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinates responses to national requests for assistance following natural and human-made disasters including terrorist acts involving CBRN substances.

 

Engagement

As the global counter-terrorism effort requires a holistic approach, Allies have resolved to strengthen outreach to and cooperation with partner countries and international actors.

 

With partners

Increasingly, partners are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms and individual cooperation agreements with NATO for counter-terrorism dialogue and tailored practical cooperation, including through defence capacity building.

 

For instance, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) package for Jordan was reviewed in 2021 and now comprises 15 initiatives, including some that are specifically aimed at supporting Jordan in its counter-terrorism efforts, such as strategic communications, the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, maritime and land border security and the development of a curriculum for Jordan’s counter-terrorism education and training. Counter-terrorism is also a high priority for partners such as Mauritania and Tunisia, for whom Allies agreed new DCB packages at the June 2022 Madrid Summit. In Madrid, Allies also agreed to offer tailored support measures to enhance the resilience of vulnerable partners against security challenges and malign foreign influence. To that end, NATO will scale up counter-terrorism engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, enabling the country to develop a whole-of-government approach in countering terrorism and to strengthen its capabilities in the areas of critical infrastructure protection and countering online radicalisation and hate speech. Additionally, NATO will provide advisory support through the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme for the standardization of counter-terrorism education in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Moldova.

 

Allies place particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity-building, civil preparedness and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively. Countering improvised explosive devices, CBRN defence, the promotion of a whole-of-government approach and military border security are among NATO’s areas of work with partners. For example, in 2023, partners from the Middle East and North Africa will attend a CBRN Awareness for First Responders Course at the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence COE in order to build awareness of CBRN threats and the capacity of these partners to coordinate across military and civilian lines of response efforts. 

 

As a result of multinational collaboration through the Partnership for Peace Consortium, NATO launched its first standardized curriculum on counter-terrorism in June 2020, aiming to support interested Allies and partners in enhancing their capacities to develop national skills and improve counter-terrorism strategies. The curriculum also serves as a reference document to support partner countries in addressing their education and training requirements relevant for fighting terrorism, under the framework of NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). In 2021, the Alliance began using this standardized curriculum to deliver online courses to participants of the Odesa Military Academy and the National Defence University in Kyiv, Ukraine. Since 2023, the Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum modules and e-learning course are available on the NATO website for interested Allies and partners.

 

Partners also contribute expertise, experience and capabilities to NATO’s work in the domain of counter-terrorism capabilities development. For example, Australia and New Zealand are part of the DAT POW community and participate in the work on Electronic Counter Measures for Radio Controlled Improvised Devices.

 

Counter-terrorism is one of the key priorities of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. The SPS Programme enhances cooperation and dialogue between scientists and experts from Allies and partners, contributing to a better understanding of the terrorist threat, the development of detection and response measures, and fostering a network of experts. Activities coordinated by the SPS Programme include workshops, training courses and multi-year research and development projects that contribute to identifying methods for the protection of critical infrastructure, supplies and personnel; human factors in defence against terrorism; technologies to detect explosive devices and illicit activities; and risk management, best practices, and use of new technologies in response to terrorism. For example, since 2018, the SPS Programme has overseen DEXTER (short for Detection of Explosives and firearms to counter TERrorism). This flagship initiative is composed of a number of projects all working together to develop an integrated system of sensors and data fusion technologies capable of detecting explosives and concealed weapons in real time to help secure mass transport infrastructures, such as airports, metro and railway stations. DEXTER was successfully tested in a live demonstration at a metro station in Rome, Italy in May 2022. Eleven governmental and research institutions from five NATO Allies (Finland (which acceded to NATO in 2023), France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and three partner countries (the Republic of Korea, Serbia and Ukraine) have participated in DEXTER.

 

With international actors

NATO cooperates with the UN, the EU, the Global-Counter Terrorism Forum, INTERPOL, and the OSCE to ensure that views and information are shared and that appropriate action can be taken more effectively in the fight against terrorism. Counter-terrorism capacity building and border security – specifically across the maritime and land domains – are two areas where NATO cooperates closely with other international organisations.

 

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with relevant UN resolutions, provide common frameworks for efforts to combat terrorism. NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its component organisations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. NATO’s Centres of Excellence and education and training opportunities are often relevant to UN counter-terrorism priorities, as is the specific area of explosives management. More broadly, NATO works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to international disasters and in consequence management, including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN 1540 Committee. For example, in March 2019, NATO and the UN launched a joint project to improve CBRN resilience in Jordan, which has since been completed.

 

NATO and the European Union are committed to combatting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They exchange information regularly on counter-terrorism projects and on related activities such as work on the protection of civilian populations against CBRN attacks. Relations and regular staff talks with the European External Action Service’s counter-terrorism section, with the Council of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator’s office and other parts of the EU help ensure mutual understanding and complementarity.

NATO maintains close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action against Terrorism Unit. Areas of joint interest between NATO and the OSCE include gender and terrorism, border security, a whole-of-government approach to counter-terrorism, as well as countering terrorist financing.

 

NATO also collaborates with INTERPOL on countering terrorism. A key issue of cooperation between the two organisations is battlefield evidence and the exchange of information collected by the military with law enforcement. For instance, INTERPOL is regularly providing expertise to NATO training courses for southern partners in this area.

NATO is also working with other regional organisations to address the terrorism threat. In April 2019, NATO and the African Union (AU) held their first joint counter-terrorism training in Algiers and in December 2019, NATO hosted the first counter-terrorism dialogue with the AU. Since then, the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism has been briefing Allies regularly and further practical cooperation is under development.

The use of civilian aircraft as a weapon in the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to enhance aviation security. NATO contributed to improved civil-military coordination of air traffic control by working with EUROCONTROL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the US Federal Aviation Administration, other major national aviation and security authorities, airlines and pilot associations and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

 

Education

NATO offers a range of training and education opportunities in the field of counter-terrorism to both Allies and partner countries. It draws on a wide network that includes the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; mobile training courses run out of Allied Joint Force Commands at Naples, Italy and Brunssum, the Netherlands; and the Centres of Excellence (COEs), which support the NATO Command Structure. There are almost 30 COEs accredited by NATO, several of which have links to the fight against terrorism. The Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Türkiye serves both as a location for meetings and as a catalyst for international dialogue and discussion on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The COE-DAT reaches out to over 50 countries and 40 organisations.

 



In 2021 and 2023, NATO delivered in-person counter-terrorism courses through Mobile Education and Training Teams at the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Regional Centre in Kuwait, benefitting almost 50 participants from NATO partner countries in the Gulf.

 

Milestones in NATO’s work on counter-terrorism

NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism

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Av Svenn Dybvik - 28 oktober 2023 00:00
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